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The Parole Board summarily denied Mr.
parole on the very same day as Mr.
interview and (1) failed to provide the individualized and detailed reasons required
by 9 NYCRR 8002.3 (b); (2) failed to provide the detailed reasons for denying parole
required by NY Executive Law 259-i(2)(A); (3) failed to explain its departure from Mr.
COMPAS assessment as required by 9 NYCRR § 8002.2; and (4) therefore, seemed
to inappropriately base its denial of parole exclusively on the nature of Mr.
long-ago
crime.
The Board’s decision was therefore “arbitrary and capricious,” and “irrational bordering
on impropriety” Russo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980), and must be vacated
and a new de novo interview must be provided to Mr.
1. THE BOARD FAILED TO EXPLAIN IN A DETAILED AND
FACTUALLY INDIVIDUALIZED MANNER HOW THE REQUIRED
STATUTORY FACTORS WERE CONSIDERED IN DENYING PAROLE
Pursuant to 2017 revisions of the Board’s regulations, when denying parole, the
Board must comply with the following:
“Reasons for the denial of parole release shall be given in detail, and shall,
in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms, address how the applicable
parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2 were considered in
the individual’s case.” 9 NYCRR 8002.3 (b) (emphasis added).
This requirement has been routinely recognized and enforced by the courts. See, Johnson
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“the record is devoid of any
indication that the Parole Board in fact considered the statutory factors that weighed in favor
of petitioner's release … In fact, during the notably truncated hearing, the Parole Board
focused on matters unrelated to any statutory factor.”) (Emphasis added); Sullivan v. NYS Bd of
Parole, 100865/18 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty, 2019) (“The decision refers only fleetingly to
petitioner's overwhelmingly positive submissions, her plans upon release, and her COMPAS
score, the latter of which predicted a low probability of recidivism; and it doesn't explain how
these factors weighed in the parole denial decision.”) (Emphasis added); Pulinario v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. NY Cty, 2014)
(“[T]he Parole Board's overwhelming emphasis was on the offense … At the hearing, there
were only passing references to the contents of petitioner's application. In the decision there
was only a perfunctory mention of all the statutory factors that weighed in Pulinario's favor.”)
(Emphasis added); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661 (2006) (holding
“actual consideration of factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of them was
before the Board.”) (Emphasis added); Cappiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010A
(Sup. Ct., NY Cnty, 2004) (finding there was no indication in the record as to whether the
commissioners had read materials supporting parole release or considered them in any way and
holding: “When the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the
Parole Board … qualitatively weigh[ed] the relevant factors in light of the three statutorily
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to conclude that the Board relied almost exclusive on Mr.
less-than-relevant,
long-past criminal history to deny Mr.
current parole application. The Board
relied upon records more than thirty-six years old, starting when Mr.
was around
17 years of age. However, the Board totally disregards and neglects to acknowledge
that Mr.
is now 53 years of age, a father and grandfather, who has managed
during his last twenty-plus years in prison to develop loving relationships with his
family, earn his high-school GED, enroll, and earn more than 40 college credits and
have an exceptionally good disciplinary record over the past few years.
While the Board in its decision admits that “[Mr.
current and more
relevant] COMPAS indicates low risk scores for felony violence, arrest, and
absconding,” Ex. 1 at 24, the Board inexplicably goes on to say that “The Panel will
depart from the aforementioned low risk scores.” Id. The Board’s failure to provide any
further explanation of such departure is a clear violation of NY Exec. Law Sec. 259-c
(4) and the Board’s own regulations (9 NYCRR Sec. 8002.2(a) (discussed separately in
Section 3. below).
Finally, the Board in its “professional judgement” concluded that Mr.
lacked remorse for his crime and the victim. While it is unclear what professional
credentials the Board members might possess to make such a “professional judgment,”
this judgment was clearly wrong since Mr.
stated that he was “sorry,” “wrong,”
“at fault,” “ashamed” or some variation thereof over 22 times during the 22 pages of
the parole interview, and his sincerity in this regard comes through to any unbiased
reader of the transcript. In addition, as part of his parole packet submitted to the Board,
Mr.
included his personal statement (See, Ex. 2) as well as his letters of apology
to the family of his victim, both of which clearly show that he has accepted
responsibility for his actions and is remorseful and sorry. See, Ex. 3.
Since the Board failed to provide the required level of detailed explanation for its
denial of Mr.
parole, its denial must be overturned, and a de novo interview
granted. See, In re McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230A (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty,
2014) (“While the Board discussed petitioner's positive activities and accomplishments
at the hearing, it then concluded that his release was incompatible with ‘public safety
and welfare.’ The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion.
It appears to have focused only on petitioner's past behavior without articulating a
rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible with
the welfare of society at this time”); Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty, 2013) (“the Board failed to
explain, other than the facts of the crime, why petitioner's release was ‘incompatible
with the public safety and welfare’ and why there was ‘a reasonable probability [he]
would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.’ … the Board ‘should be
well able to articulate the reasoning’ for its decision, ‘if it were come to reasonably, in a
non-arbitrary, uncapricious manner.’”); Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of
Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 742-43 (2d Dept 2009 (must give statutory factors adequate
consideration); Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 100865/18 (S. Ct., NY Cnty, 2019)
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(“There is no explanation why the 25 year old crime outweighed the voluminous
evidence that indicates petitioner would presently be able to lead a quiet and crime-free
life in society.”). Platten v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1064 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan Cnty. 2015) (finding failure to explain reason for denial in detail: “Based on
the record and the lack of specificity in the decision, the court cannot determine what
concern the Board had for the public safety and welfare, and why it had that concern at
the time of the interview in 2014.”); Rivera v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 872, 874(3d Dep’t
2019) (“While the Parole Board noted that the petitioner had incurred more than 30
disciplinary violations while imprisoned since the 1980's, the Parole Board did not
discuss the history of these violations or explain how these violations, many of which
were decades old, had a bearing upon its determination that the petitioner's request for
release was not compatible with the welfare of society.”).
3. THE BOARD FAILED TO EXPLAIN ITS DEPARTURE FROM MR.
COMPAS REPORT AS REQUIRED BY LAW AND
REGULATION
As stated above, the Board expressly acknowledged in its decision that “[Mr.
COMPAS indicates low risk scores for felony violence, arrest, and absconding.” See, Ex.1,
page 24. The Board also expressly admitted that it was departing from Mr.
low
COMPAS scores, Id., but failed to provide any further explanation about which COMPAS
scales it was departing from or its reasons for doing so.
This is a clear violation of the law and regulations. See, NY Exec. Law 259-c (4) and
NYCRR Sec. 8002.2(a) and requires the Appeal Unit to overturn the parole decision and order a
new de novo hearing. See, George Hill v. New York State Board of Parole, 2020 WL 6393881
(N.Y. Sup.) (Finding “the Board failed to articulate the reasons for this determination with
respect to Mr. Hill's low COMPAS Risks and Needs Assessment scores or to ‘provide an
individualized reason for this departure,’ in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8002.2.5 The Board's
failure to consider this assessment is relevant in light of petitioner's remorse, accomplishments
in prison, his skills, release plans and positive scores on his COMPAS Risk Assessment.”);
Robinson v. Stanford, No. 2392/2018, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019) (ordering de
novo interview for man with two murder convictions and low COMPAS scores because “the
Parole Board’s finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of
society directly contradicts these scores in his COMPAS assessment. As the Board’s
determination denying release departed from these risks and needs assessment scores, pursuant
to 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 it was required to articulate with specificity the particular scale in any
needs and assessment from which it was departing and provide an individualized reason for
such departure. The Board’s conclusory statement that it considered statutory factors, including
petitioner’s risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and needs for successful community reentry in finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of society
fails to meet this standard. As such, its determination denying parole release was affected by an
error of law.”) (Emphasis added); Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty)
(finding the Board did not comply with 8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the
lowest possible COMPAS risk scores of felony violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding
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that there was a reasonable probability the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty
without violating the law); Phillips v. Stanford, 52579/19 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess Cnty, 2019 (J.
Rosa) (Finding that Board’s decision that release would be incompatible with the welfare of
society directly contradicted lowest COMPAS scores in risk of felony violence, re-arrest,
absconding, criminal involvement, and unlikelihood of issues with family support or significant
financial problems upon release. “The Board was thus required to articulate with specificity the
particular scales in petitioner's COMPAS assessment from which it was departing and provide
an individualized reason for such departures. The Board's conclusory statement that it
considered statutory factors, including his institutional adjustment, discipline, program
participation and needs for successful re-entry in finding that the discretionary release would
not be compatible with the welfare of society fails to meet this standard.”) (Emphasis added);
Stokes v. Stanford, Slip Op. 50899(U), at *2 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. June 9, 2014) (“In
petitioner's interview with the Board, it made note that there were no negatives in his prison
disciplinary history since his last appearance, he has made positive efforts towards his
rehabilitation, including obtaining his GED, done vocational training, ART, ASAT, Phase I, II
and III, would be living with his wife if released, and that his COMPAS risk reveals he is at low
risk for violence, re-arrest or absconding. However, and in stark contrast, in its determination
the Board denied parole release based only upon the finding that petitioner committed murder
during a robbery, and that his plea to the murder charge resolved three pending robberies. The
determination simply fails to make any analysis of the steps toward rehabilitation, or his postrelease plans, and why and how those factors were dismissed.”) Banks, Javon, 96A4152, AC #:
02-068-19 SC (Otisville CF) (vacated and remanded for 2nd de novo interview, July 27,
2022) (https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/12/02-06819sc banksjavon 96a4152.pdf); Woodburn, Ashton, 95A1877, AC#: 09-079-20 B (Otisville
CF) (https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2021/06/09-07920b woodburnashton 95a1877.pdf)

4. THE BOARD INAPPROPRIATELY BASED ITS DENIAL OF
PAROLE EXCLUSIVELY ON THE NATURE OF MR.
CRIME AND HIS LONG-PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY
Since a review of the record indicates that all other factors weighed in favor of granting
Mr.
release on parole, the Board, sitting in Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, 2nd
Department, appears to have based its denial of parole decision exclusively on the nature of Mr.
crime.
This is not permitted under rulings by the 2nd Department. See, Ferrante v. Stanford, 172
AD3d 31 (2d Dep’t 2019) ("the Board may not deny an inmate parole based solely on the
seriousness of the offense."); Coleman v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 69
N.Y.S.3d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dept 2014);
Perfetto v. Evans, 112 A.D.3d 640 (2d Dep’t 2013); Gelsomino v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 82
A.D.3d 1097 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Here, in denying the petitioner's application for release on
parole, the Parole Board cited only the circumstances of the underlying crimes and failed to
mention any of the other statutory factors, including his excellent disciplinary record, his record
of achievements while incarcerated, as well as positive statements made by the sentencing
court.”); Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Where the Parole Board denies
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release to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance, it acts irrationally.”); Mitchell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d
742 (2d Dep’t 2009)( While the seriousness of the underlying offense remains acutely relevant
in determining whether the petitioner should be released on parole, the record supports the
petitioner's contention that the Parole Board failed to take other relevant statutory factors into
account.); O’Connor v. Stanford, 54/2021 (Dutchess Cnty, J. Rosa, 2021); Thwaites v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) ([The Board’s updated
risk] procedures .... will rationalize parole decision-making by placing the focus primarily on
who the person appearing before the Parole Board is today and on whether that person can
succeed in the community after release, rather than—as under the previous “guidelines”—on
who the person was many years earlier when she or he committed the crime.)
For this reason, the Board’s decision should be overturned, and a de novo interview
granted.
5. THE BOARD’S DECISION TO DENY MR.
PAROLE IS
AN UNLAWFUL RESENTENCING EXCEEDING THE BOARD’S
AUTHORITY
The authority to determine criminal sentences is vested in the legislature and in the judge
who imposed the sentence.
In considering whether to grant parole, the Parole Board is limited to determining whether
release at the present time is appropriate under the statutory standards. King v. N.Y. State Div.
of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1994) (emphasis added) (“The role of the Parole Board is
not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the
appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the
relevant statutory factors, he should be released.”) (emphasis added); Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd.
of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“[t]he role of the Parole Board is not to
resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate
penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory
factors, he should be released. In that regard, the statute expressly mandates that the prisoner's
educational and other achievements affirmatively be taken into consideration in determining
whether he meets the general criteria relevant to parole release.”) (Emphasis added)
In its decision, the Board focused primarily on the nature of Mr.
20-plus year-old
crime, citing the details of his offense, his criminal history dating back nearly 37 years, and his
perceived lack of remorse to deny Mr.
parole. With the exception of his perceived lack of
remorse, which we have corrected in Section 2., above, the Board’s justifications are clearly
historical, backward-looking and retributory, and the antitheses of the required present
evaluation of Mr.
current state of rehabilitation and deservedness of parole.
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6. THE BOARD FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER MR.
REENTRY PLAN
While the Board acknowledged that Mr.
had presented a well-developed
“Case Plan” that “…outlined a number of goals to further enhance your
rehabilitation…” and thanked him for that (See, Ex. 1, p.13), that is the only mention
of Mr.
“Case Plan” during the parole interview.
Moreover, there is absolutely no mention or reference to Mr.
plan” or “reentry plan” in the Board’s decision. See, Ex. 1, at 23-24.

“case

Given Mr.
comprehensive and detailed reentry plans, this is a critical oversight as
well as a violation of law by the Parole Board. See, Ex. 4, Mr.
Reentry Plans.
Since his incarceration, Mr.
has worked various jobs that have afforded him a wide
range of skills that will assist him in securing employment once released. Currently, he is a
clerk with the Prison-to-College Pipeline (P2CP) program, assisting new students, managing
classroom setup, and organizing the book-lending process. He has also worked as a painter and
typist at Otisville. He is a self-taught typist, and proudly states he has improved so much that he
no longer has to look at the keys. In addition, he has held jobs as a porter, mess hall cook, and
industry tailor.
Mr.
has taken advantage of many courses during his incarceration. Most notably, he
received his GED in 2013, which he states was one of the best days of his life. Since then, Mr.
has developed a strong passion for learning and writing. He has served as a teacher’s aide
and educational clerk at Bare Hill, at Auburn, and again in Otisville. Mr.
has cherished
the opportunity to act as a mentor and establish rapport with others, something he feels he never
had the chance to do before entering prison. His academic adviser, Ms. Gittler, encouraged
Miles to continue his educational pursuits.
In 2019, he enrolled in John Jay P2CP as an undergraduate and has continued to take
classes ever since; he is currently in his fourth semester of the program and is on his way to
earning his bachelor’s degree. He has taken classes in sociology, English, creative writing,
math, and theater and excelled in them all, making the Dean’s List with a 3.7 GPA. Mr.
believes in education for its own sake, recognizing its transformational potential, and he also
sees it as essential to his aspirations as a future social worker. All six of his professors have
reflected on his enthusiastic engagement with his assignments and his brilliant coursework; see
their enclosed recommendation letters at Ex. 5.
Mr.
has multiple housing options. He has reached out to numerous organizations
based in Manhattan and Brooklyn that responded with letters of reasonable assurance in
preparation for his release. See, Ex. 6 for Letters of Reasonable Assurance. Exodus Transitional
Community are committed to supporting Mr.
reentry by securing a hotel room
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Id. Early on in the interview, Mr.
was informed by Commissioner Davis that “Right now
your presentation appears to be somewhat robotic, somewhat rehearsed, and I don’t want you to
come across that way in the interview.” Mr.
also observed the commissioners smirking
throughout the interview in response to many of his responses. And, when Mr.
testified
that he was asking for another chance in society to make amends and atone and to pay back his
debt by helping others, Commissioner Davis callously responded that “There’s a lot you can do
in terms of restorative practices while incarcerated. There’s a whole building full of people there
who need some restoration and healing, so perhaps your work can start there.”
Indications that the Board’s parole denial was predetermined is a ground for a de novo
interview. See, King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788.
See Johnson v. N.Y.Bd. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude
on the record before us that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory
factors and that there is ‘a strong indication that the denial of petitioner's application was a
foregone conclusion.’”); Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46
Misc. 3d 603 (Sup Ct. Sullivan Cty. 2014) (“at least one Commissioner was argumentative
and appeared to have made the decision prior to the parole interview.”) Morris v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cty. 2013) (“When,
as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner's crime, there is a strong
indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with
statutory requirements.”) (Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
For each reason stated above, the Board’s denial of Mr.
and a new hearing de novo held.
DATED: July 19, 2022,

parole should be vacated

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin J. Halloran, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law and Pro Bono Counsel
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